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Policing is a key aspect of the state monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, and 
the latter is generally regarded as a defi ning and essential characteristic of the modern 
sovereign state (Weber 1978, pp. 54–6; Poggi 1990). In a handbook on multi- level gov-
ernance, international policing is thus not an obvious choice because states could be 
expected to protect sovereignty rather than to exercise it jointly in multi- level systems. If 
they nevertheless do so, we would anticipate relatively few and weak international insti-
tutions and states taking great care to keep these institutions under control and prefer-
ring the joint management of sovereignty to more intrusive forms.
While there is some truth in this expectation, it is only half of the story. The history 
and current form of international cooperation against transnational criminality show 
a diff erent picture: for decades, the fi eld has been marked by an increasing depth of 
cooperation. International police cooperation is by no means restricted to the European 
Union (EU) but also takes place within the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe 
(CoE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a 
number of other organizations and regimes. As is the case in many other areas, interna-
tional policing is increasingly marked by a dense web of multi- level structures, shaping, 
constraining and regulating state activity.
It is the aim of this chapter to shed light on these structures and their impact on the 
state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. In order to do so, the inquiry 
cannot be limited to the pure exercise of force by policemen but must also look at legiti-
mating action, the defi nition of problems, the prescription of certain methods of action 
and the authorization of the use of force (Friedrichs 2008, pp. 5–7). In the following, we 
describe the form and intensity of cooperation within multi- level structures in interna-
tional policing (Section 31.1) and explain its origins and shape (Section 31.2). Finally, we 
raise the question whether multi- level governance in the fi eld of policing is eff ective and 
meets the standards of liberal democracies (Section 31.3). While international policing 
encompasses a number of diff erent issues, our empirical examples stem from the most 
important ones: the fi ght against terrorism and the fi ght against drugs, including money 
laundering. Both are considered as major transnational security threats to the state 
and society. While terrorism most explicitly challenges the existence of the state, the 
paramount importance of drug enforcement is revealed by the fact that drug dealing and 
addiction endanger the health of citizens and that narcotics constitute the largest of all 
illicit markets, endangering the economic stability of states.
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31.1  DEVELOPMENT AND FORM OF MULTI- LEVEL 
GOVERNANCE
Multi- level governance in the area of policing started in highly specifi c sectors where 
states reacted on perceived transnational problems by institutionalizing cooperation: the 
production and trade of certain drugs and terrorism.
In both fi elds, interstate cooperation was launched already in the early twentieth 
century (Dubin 1991; McAllister 2000). However, for many decades cooperation 
remained weak, informal and ad hoc. While Interpol, the international organization 
devoted to police cooperation, had already been created in the 1920s, most states consid-
ered it as ineff ective and impractical (Anderson 1989). In the 1960s, police cooperation 
started slowly on a bilateral level, a famous example being the ‘French Connection’ when 
the USA exerted pressure on the French police to cooperate with US police forces crack-
ing down on cross- border drug traffi  c (Cusack 1974, pp. 242–4). Among European states, 
this issue- specifi c bilateral cooperation developed into the creation of regular multilat-
eral information exchange forums in the 1970s. The fi rst and best- known was TREVI, 
an informal arrangement of the European Economic Community (EEC) member states 
which united ministers of the interior and which was kept as informal and even confi -
dential as possible (Bigo 1996, p. 88). However, within the EEC police cooperation was 
to a large degree left out of this development well until the 1990s. The format of police 
cooperation in its early years confi rms a standard hypothesis of international relations 
theory: states may be willing to enter into intensive cooperation and even to become part 
of multi- level institutions in order to avoid collective action problems or increase their 
welfare, but they will do their best to preserve the core of sovereignty intact. Hence, we 
cannot speak of multi- level governance during this period with its issue- specifi c, informal 
and ad hoc pattern of institution- building. In consequence, the term ‘multi- level govern-
ance’ should not be used interchangeably with ‘international cooperation.’ Rather, it 
should be restricted to instances in which a new level of governance emerges that is at 
least to some degree independent from the states which have originally created it.
Since the 1970s, the situation has changed fundamentally. The EU developed into a 
multi- level polity with increasing geographical range, increasing institutional depth and 
increasing policy scope incrementally including policing. With the creation of the third 
pillar, the Maastricht Treaty brought the fi eld of police and justice formally into the EU 
structure. At the latest since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has made the creation 
of an ‘area of freedom, security, and justice’ (AFSJ) a political priority equivalent to 
the creation of the internal market. The Nice Treaty and even more the Lisbon Treaty 
provide for substantial EU legislative powers in the fi eld of policing, and the diff erences 
in the legislative process of this area as opposed to the classical community method used 
for market integration have substantially decreased. There is now a European Police 
Offi  ce (Europol) and a substantial amount of legislation, most notably the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW).1
But these developments are not restricted to the EU. The UN has developed an 
almost universal system of drug control which not only defi nes very precisely what an 
illicit drug is and the duties of states to act against their use but also massively restricts 
the policy autonomy of the participating states. In 1989, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), a technical body of the OECD, was established, which quickly became 
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the cornerstone of a regime on money laundering. It provides for tight supervision of 
fi nancial fl ows even for relatively minor sums and substantial powers, for example, for 
the confi scation of suspect money or the blocking of bank accounts for the participat-
ing states and even touched upon the taboo of banking secrecy (Gilmore 2004). Next to 
the UN and the FATF, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confi scation of the Proceeds from Crime in 1990, and only one year 
later the European Community agreed on a directive against money laundering which 
was amended by a new directive in 2001.2 In summary, there are now partly overlapping 
systems of multi- level governance with a territorial character in the case of the EU and 
with a sectoral character for all others, most notably within the UN and the OECD (cf. 
Hooghe and Marks, Chapter 1 in this volume). More important than this diff erence, 
however, is what they have in common.
In the fi rst place, these multi- level systems cover a wide variety of activities relating to 
the monopoly of force – with one notable exception: they do not create an actor which 
can legitimately use physical force independent from the states. Instead, they defi ne 
problems, legitimate measures, provide for methods of prosecution and authorize action 
relating to the states’ exercise of the monopoly of force. The UN drugs regime, for 
instance, contains an extensive list of substances which are considered to be illicit drugs, 
leaving no room for interpretation. The EAW contains a list of 32 off enses for which 
it applies obliging states to surrender the arrested person. These multi- level systems 
also authorize and proscribe what states have to do when they encounter the problems 
 identifi ed and legitimated.
A second important tendency is the trend away from a political decision- making 
process to a criteria- based judicial process. This entails a reduction of the freedom of 
choice for state authorities when and how to use their monopoly of force. This applies 
to the drugs regime which makes it virtually impossible for states to follow their own 
path by, for example, giving drugs to addicts in a controlled and supervised fashion. But 
the best illustration is the transformation from the European extradition regime to the 
EAW. Historically, states have in principle accepted the idea of extraditing their citizens 
to other states for trial. As states considered this to be a deep intervention into their sov-
ereignty, extradition even among the consolidated democracies of the EU has tradition-
ally been slow and subject to a fi nal political authorization. The EAW introduces a new 
system based on the principle of ‘mutual recognition,’ which was originally developed 
in the context of product safety but which is now being transferred to standards for the 
rule of law and for criminal justice. It drastically reduces the possibilities of a political 
veto and only foresees a purely procedural legal appeal before the surrender actually 
takes place. States even surrender their own nationals to requesting states following this 
procedure. For many practitioners and scholars, the EAW is a true revolution (Plachta 
2003).
31.2  EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE AND FORM OF MULTI-
 LEVEL GOVERNANCE
Turning to the origins of multi- level governance in the fi eld of international policing, we 
seek to address why it has emerged and to explain its form. With regard to the emergence 
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of multi- level governance, three aspects stand out. Most remarkably, the emergence and 
increase of cooperation is driven by a particular problem perception. Perceiving inter-
national terrorism, drug traffi  cking and money laundering as problems transgressing 
national territories has played a key role in pressuring states to agree on intensifi ed coop-
eration and the build- up of new institutions. In the 1960s, states recognized that drug 
traffi  c routes go across continents; in the 1970s, terrorists of diff erent national origins 
perpetrated acts all over Europe ‘internationalizing’ the problem; and with the increase 
of cross- border economic activities in the 1980s, the laundering of drug money was 
perceived as an enormous threat to the economic stability of states. Today, globalized 
trade and abolished customs control in certain regions have augmented the pressure for 
internationally coordinated responses against transnational criminal activity further. 
Moreover, this problem perception is very much event- driven – transnational crime 
fi ghting tends to follow the ‘politics of the latest outrage.’ For instance, after a series of 
attacks, most notably on the Olympic village in Munich in 1972, terrorism moved to the 
top of the international agenda and after the events of September 11 the fi ght acquired 
new momentum.
While the pressure stemming from problem perception explains the establishment of 
cooperation, the diff usion of specifi c norms through institutional structures has increased 
the intensity and binding character of international institutions against criminal activity. 
The international drug prohibition regime dating back to the early twentieth century 
structured by a series of three international drug treaties under the aegis of the UN is 
a case in point. Today’s interpretation of drugs has been developed over the course of 
decades. The illegality of drugs and the interpretation of their use as deviant is something 
which is taken more or less for granted. Nearly all states of the world have signed the UN 
treaties, accepting legal constraints regarding the production, sale, possession and con-
sumption of drugs (Levine 2003, p. 145). Prohibiting money laundering of drug profi ts 
pertinently shows that next to the binding character of the regime’s rules, the acceptance 
of its underlying norms infl uences the compliance of the signatory states. States do not 
want to appear ‘soft’ on drug traffi  cking making it very diffi  cult to articulate reservations 
against particular measures against money laundering (Dombrowski 1998, p. 15). Over 
four decades, the universal acceptance of drugs as illicit and the ensuing legal sanctions 
regarding trade and consumption has resulted in a ‘global drug prohibition regime’ 
(Nadelman 1990).
Finally, the eff ects of a perceived problem pressure and the diff usion of global norms 
have been paralleled and reinforced by functional and organizational spillover eff ects 
in the fi eld of international policing. In particular, the completion of the EU’s internal 
market with its abolition of internal borders established de facto a common internal secu-
rity zone decreasing the validity of borders both as instruments of control and obstacles 
to transnational criminal activity (Monar 2001, pp. 754–5). The successive inclusion of 
the fi eld of policing and justice within the EU structure leading to the AFSJ impressively 
demonstrates this spillover from the economic sphere. The introduction of the principle 
of mutual recognition within the framework of the EAW represents the major example 
for this eff ect. While originally introduced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
its famous ‘Cassis de Dijon’ ruling in 1979 for the area of economic cooperation, the 
application of mutual recognition in criminal matters now helps judicial decisions travel 
across borders. However, spillover eff ects can also be found outside the EU. When in 
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1988 states established the money laundering regime with the UN Convention against 
Illicit Traffi  c in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the basic idea to make 
drug dealing more risky for drug traffi  ckers was taken up quickly by other institutional 
forums like the FATF and the Council of Europe.
While international policing stems from various sources, its form is above all due to 
the general reluctance of states to cede national sovereignty to a supranational level. 
Overall, modes of cooperation are preferred that preserve a maximum of sovereignty 
and the development of the fi eld clearly demonstrates this preference. In the 1970s and 
1980s, ad hoc measures and expert- driven cooperation, mainly through diff erent police 
networks (such as TREVI) were dominant. The epistemic communities of high- ranking 
police offi  cials and their demands for pragmatic and functional cooperation have shaped 
to a great extent the preferences of states on the outlook of international policing (Bigo 
1996). However, and despite these preferences for sovereignty- preserving forms of coop-
eration, the institutional framework matters. It is thus no surprise that over time the 
most intensive and intrusive forms of international police cooperation have emerged 
in the EU. Even more as the EU is one of the rare examples of a governance body in 
the international arena bundling together diff erent policy competences (cf. Hooghe and 
Marks in this volume). EU member states favored effi  ciency- enhancing cooperation in 
the EU to the UN’s sovereignty- preserving but less eff ective framework.
31.3  EVALUATING MULTI- LEVEL GOVERNANCE
Having described multi- level governance in the fi eld of crime fi ghting, we have traced 
its origins and sought to explain its form. It is now time to take a step back for an 
evaluation. The main virtue has been on the side of capacities for eff ective problem-
 solving. While the central problems of transnational crime such as drug- trading and 
terrorism persist, institutions have been set up to deal with these problems. They seri-
ously constrain national policies and work on a shared normative understanding of the 
problems at hand. The main defi cit of multi- level governance is its record regarding the 
protection of individual rights and democratic participation. The evaluation can thus be 
framed according to the classic opposition of security versus freedom: security has been 
enhanced by the system, but freedom seems to suff er.
The straightforward way of proving eff ective problem- solving capacity would seem 
to be measuring problem reduction. In the case of crime fi ghting, one could think of 
falling crime rates. The diffi  culties with such numbers are however manifold. Not only is 
it notoriously diffi  cult to compare data between countries, it is also diffi  cult to compare 
data across time. Defi nitions of crime are socially constructed. Hence, they are subject 
to changes and can be easily criticized. Moreover, once a social phenomenon has been 
defi ned as a crime and moved into the focus of the prosecuting agencies, offi  cial numbers 
might rise and not fall: if more eff ort is put into crime detection, more crimes will be 
detected. Nonetheless, crime rates might be used as an indicator of problem- solving 
capacities. We could consider the number of drug- related deaths to be an indicator of 
the overall eff ectiveness of drugs policies. It rose in Western Europe until the early 1990s 
and then stagnated with a slight decrease since 2000.3 With regard to the EAW, arrests 
and surrenders constitute the relevant fi gures. The last Commission report on the EAW 
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(COM (2007) 407) mentions that 6900 warrants were issued in 2005, leading to 1770 
arrests of which 86 percent were surrendered to the issuing member state. Numbers have 
increased in comparison to the preceding year. Surrender is much faster than under the 
old extradition procedures: it is now under fi ve weeks, while it used to be around a year.
While these numbers hint at successes, we believe a diff erent approach tells us more 
about problem- solving capacities. The question is whether institutions have been set up 
which are equipped to deal with problems eff ectively. The mere existence of institutional 
structures is not enough. Interaction in them has to be intensive enough to make success-
ful cooperation possible. But what is more, the output produced should be of a binding 
character. It should not be mere talk, but ideally bind actors in two ways. First, the 
established rules ought to be binding: it should be diffi  cult for actors not to comply with 
them. Second, the regime should establish norms that intrinsically guide actor behavior: 
they accept that the underlying rationale of the regime is right. If a regime is binding in 
this sense, it is well equipped to deal with problems eff ectively.
Both are the case in the issue area of international crime fi ghting. First, the nation-
 state’s monopoly of force has become embedded into a system of multi- level decision-
 making that constrains national policies. The constraining eff ect is highly visible in 
the drug- prohibition regime. The UK and Germany have been repeatedly criticized 
for establishing shooting galleries and for testing the prescription of heroin to addicts. 
Second, the criminalization of drugs that is at the heart of the UN regime has become a 
universally accepted norm. Similarly, it is hardly disputed that the fi ght against money-
 laundering is a successful method to combat drug traffi  cking. The norm is so powerful 
that very elaborate prosecution systems have been set up and traditional taboos such 
as banking secrecy have had to give way. We can thus conclude that the multi- level 
 governance of crime fi ghting is rather eff ective.
While making banking secrecy less absolute has been interpreted as a sign of 
eff ectiveness, it constitutes also a defi cit. More security may come at the expense of 
freedom – and banking secrecy is one expression of the individual’s right to privacy, 
which is a fundamental freedom. As exemplifi ed in this case, multi- level policies against 
crime have impacted heavily on individual freedoms. The most signifi cant impair-
ments have occurred in the fi elds of informational freedom/privacy and of judicial 
rights. Informational freedom refers to the individual’s right to determine or at least 
to know who possesses what information about him or her. One case in point is the 
exchange of data with Europol. Europol’s main activity is currently the compilation 
and analysis of data. Data protection is not governed by a common standard, but by 
the national standards of the member state that inserted particular data into the system 
or –  signifi cantly – that has last edited it. However, all member states have to comply 
with the 1981 Convention on Data Protection by the CoE. For countries with a higher 
standard than that prescribed by the convention the arrangement may eff ectively lower 
standards (Lavenex and Wagner 2007, p. 238). The data protection standards may be 
further lowered by exchange with third countries. The impairments result directly from 
the multi- level nature of the cooperation.
The same is true for judicial rights. As has been outlined, the EAW is the fi rst appli-
cation of the principle of mutual recognition to the creation of the AFSJ. Mutual rec-
ognition measures are easier to agree on than harmonization legislation as they do not 
require substantive changes of national legislation and do not spell out the diff erences 
M2424 - ENDERLEIN PRINT.indd   482 1/9/10   16:45:03
International policing   483
between legislations (cf. Mitsilegas 2006; Lavenex 2007). However, some harmonization 
of procedural rights would be required to give them eff ect in proceedings across Europe 
– but the member states have not yet agreed on the proposed Framework Decision on 
procedural rights.
A further example regarding judicial rights is the listing of terrorists by the UN 
Security Council and the EU to freeze their fi nancial assets. These decisions defy due 
process standards in several ways. Individuals should be notifi ed of the decision, they 
should be given reasons for the decision and should be able to challenge it in court. 
However, due to the multi- level nature of the issue (national intelligence, international 
decision, national implementation) it is unclear whether such decisions can be challenged, 
and if so, in which courts (Frowein 2004, p. 76). The EU has adopted regulations that 
transpose the UN decisions, but also add further persons to the lists. The ECJ has been 
hesitant to check whether the listing harms fundamental rights (cf. Peers 2003, p. 239; 
Eeckhout 2007; Guild 2008, pp. 181–90). However, in its recent OMPI4 judgment it 
required the Council to fulfi ll certain due process requirements when putting somebody’s 
name on the list (fair hearing, statement of reasons and eff ective judicial protection). The 
Council subsequently changed the procedure so that listed persons will now be informed 
and given some reasons for their listing.
Multi- level governance has not only impacted negatively on individual freedoms. 
Policy- making in the issue area also performs poorly as regards democratic participa-
tion. The dominant mode of decision- making is executive multilateralism: executives are 
the only actors that have a say in the fi nal decision and very often they are the only ones 
involved at all. While this system of governance has a multi- level nature, the units at the 
lower level are not made up of heterogeneous factions that could aff ect decision- making 
(cf. Mayer, Chapter 3 in this volume). Rather, all factions except for the executive are 
excluded. This is of course true of governance by intergovernmental networks, but also 
of EU governance in the fi eld, which has been described as ‘intensive transgovernmen-
talism’ (Lavenex and Wallace 2005). National parliaments are confronted with fi xed 
bargains and the European Parliament does not have a say either as it is merely con-
sulted. However, the latter’s involvement has gradually increased. With the Treaty of 
Lisbon it would get co- decision regarding some aspects of police cooperation. Mutual 
recognition as a method is democratic at fi rst sight, as it keeps national legislation in 
place that has been adopted according to democratic processes. However, it subjects 
individuals to criminal law that has been produced in a political community that is not 
their own (Mitsilegas 2006, pp. 1287–8). Multi- level governance does not only limit par-
ticipation in policy- making, it also depoliticizes policies as it withdraws certain policy 
options from political discourse. The prescription of heroin to addicts is not an option, 
but also pain treatment is complicated by the UN drugs regime. Development- oriented 
measures that could be an alternative to opium or coca crop eradication have a hard 
standing.
31.4  CONCLUSION
As in other issue areas, multi- level governance also exists in the fi eld of policing. In fact, 
we have shown that the extent and the binding character of multi- level governance are 
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substantially higher than one might expect. While diffi  culties of agreement, weak forms 
of cooperation and a focus on technical expertise have marked the early years of inter-
national police cooperation, the picture has changed. During the last decades, states 
have entered into an increasingly dense web of institutions for police cooperation by no 
means restricted to the EU but including the UN and a number of other organizations 
and regimes. Today, the states’ use of the police, and hence the use of their monopoly 
of force, becomes increasingly constrained by and embedded in international institu-
tions. This is clear evidence of multi- level governance. States get entrapped by the unin-
tentional consequences of initial, largely functional approaches to international police 
cooperation, which are diffi  cult to change once established.
However, states do not ‘give up’ their monopoly of force – there is no sign of supra-
nationalization of the actual use of force in the OECD world. Cooperation against tran-
snational crime is much more about regulating the exercise of the monopoly of force by 
embedding it in a system of multi- level decision- making. Diff erent levels assume diff erent 
tasks in this multi- level system of governance: regulation and legitimation take place at 
higher levels, while the actual use of force is still located at the lower level. In our view, 
the EAW illustrates best this typical pattern of multi- level governance in areas close to 
the state monopoly of force. While the EAW does not allow police agents from one state 
to arrest a criminal in another state, a commonly agreed legal framework regulates how 
states should proceed when putting their monopoly of force into the service of other 
states. Hence, only states have police agents with the right to use force but this right is 
embedded into an increasing net of supranational or international regulation.
A perception of certain problems in the fi eld of policing as crossing borders has led to 
the creation of policy- making institutions at a level beyond the nation- state that would 
match the territorial scale of the problems (cf. Geys and Konrad, Chapter 2 in this 
volume). Today, states jointly exercise policy- making authority by adopting substantial 
rules in the fi eld of police activity. These substantial rules become increasingly precise 
and detailed and also include strong monitoring mechanisms. As a result, states still 
possess the monopoly of the use of physical force but the concrete usage and its legiti-
mating reasons are increasingly determined by international or supranational institu-
tions. States are not free any more to decide whom they want to extradite or rather not 
to extradite, whether they want to provide shooting galleries and under which conditions 
to confi scate money. These systems are diffi  cult to change because such change would 
require supermajorities. Exit is equally close to impossible either because of a prevailing 
normative hegemony in the fi elds of drug control and money laundering or because it 
is linked to the overall structure of the EU. The EU in addition even increasingly intro-
duces supranational jurisprudence into the fi eld.
How eff ective and legitimate is this multi- level governance of international policing? 
Overall, it has been rather eff ective as it has been able to improve security, but this has 
come at the cost of less individual freedom and decision- making processes that do not 
meet democratic standards. Low politicization, low involvement of civil society versus 
executive multilateralism in decision- making characterize the fi eld. Yet, if international 
police cooperation is meant to grow in the coming years, a balanced approach to 
freedom and security needs to be found. Multi- level governance in the fi eld of polic-
ing should not come at the price of individual freedom and the lowering of established 
democratic standards.
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NOTES
1. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures Between Member States, OJ L 190, 18 July 2002, pp. 1–18.
2. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confi scation of the Proceeds from Crime, European 
Treaty Series No. 141, 8 November 1990; Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the Use of the 
Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 76–82. 
3. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats08/DRD 
(accessed 18 February, 2009).
4. OMPI: Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran, Case T- 228/02, judgment of 12 December 2006.
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